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Abstract 
Conditions are given for the formal posterior of an impropar prior to be 
coherent in the sense of (4] and applied to translation models. An example is 
given of a proper countably additive statistical model and a finitely additive 
prior for which there is no posterior. 
1. Introduction. 
A notion of coherence for statistical inferences was introduced in a 
previous paper [4]. It was shown that an inference is coherent if and only if 
it corresponds to the posterior of a finitely additive prior. A similar result 
was proved for predictions and predictive inferences in [6]. 
In practice many Bayesians use improper, countably additive priors to 
represent diffuse prior knowledge rather than finitely additive priors. There 
are several reasons for this including the relatively easy calculation and the 
essential uniqueness of the formal posterior of an improper prior and the lack 
of familiarity with the finitely additive theory. As was shown by examples in 
[4], the use of an improper prior sometimes results in a coherent inference and 
sometimes not. The obvious problem is to find an effective criterion for 
determining when an inference from an improper prior will be coherent. 
Bayesians have long justified their use of improper priors by arguing that 
they can be approximated in some sense by proper priors. A useful discussion is 
given by Stone [8] who defines a notion of approximation which we adopt for our 
purposes. Our first result (Theorem 3.1) is that an improper prior leads to a 
coherent inference if and only if it can be approximated by proper priors in 
this sense. Even this result is difficult to apply in specific examples. 
However, it can be used to derive a sufficient condition for coherence which is 
often easy to verify. This condition is presented in Theorem 3.2 and applied in 
several examples. 
There is another difficulty with the characterization of coherent inferences 
as posteriors of finitely additive priors. Namely, not every finitely additive 
2 
prior has a posterior. Examples of this phenomenon presented heretofore have 
involved finitely additive conditionals as well as a finitely additive prior. 
An example is presented below in which the conditionals are countably additive 
with finite support. Thus it can happen that, even for a standard statistical 
model, a finitely additive prior leads to no inference. 
The next section contains the necessary definitions and preliminary results. 
2. Preliminaries. 
For any set S, P(S) denotes the collection of finitely additive probability 
measures defined on all subsets of S. If f is a bounded, real-valued function 
defined on Sand YE P(S), then the Y-integral off will be written Y(f), JfdY, 
or Jf(s)Y(ds). 
Let 0 and X be nonempty sets corresponding to the set of possible states of 
nature and the set of possible outcomes for a certain exp~riment, respectively. 
A statistical~ pis a mapping which assigns to each e ~ 0 an element p0 of 
P(X). An inference q assigns to each x EX on element q of P(0). Thus pis a 
X 
conditional probability distribution on X given 0 and q is a conditional 
distribution on 0 given X. Let §(0) and ~(X) be given a-fields of subsets of 0 
and X, respectively. The model p (inference q) is called measurable if every p6 
(qx) is countably additive on §(X) (~(0)) and p (q) is a regular conditional 
distribution. The standard models and inferences of statistics are, of course, 
measurable. 
An inference q might correspond in practice to a system of confidence 
intervals, a posterior distribution, or a fiducial distribution. For an 
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operational interpretation, regard q as a conditional odds function used by the 
X 
statistician to post odds on subsets of 0 after observing x. The inference q is 
called coherent if it is impossible for a gambler to devise a system based on q, 
which consists of placing a finite number of bets on subsets of 0 after xis 
observed and which attains an expected payoff greater than some positive 
constant for every e £ 0. (See (4] for the precise definition.) 
An element n of P(0) will be called a prior. A prior~ and model p 
determine a marginal m E P(X) by the formula 
(2 .1) 
for bounded functions~= X ~ R. Let~= ~(~)x§(X) be the product a-field on 
0xX. An inference q is call a posterior for the prior n, the model p being 
understood, if 
(2.2) ff ,ce,x)p9(dx)n(d0) = ff ,ca,x)qx(de)m(dx) 
for all bounded, ~-measurable functions~= 0xX ~ R. In other words, q is a 
conditional distribution for 0 given X under the measure on B determined by~ 
and pas defined by the left-hand-side of (2.2). 
The model p and inference q are called consistent if there exist n £ P(0) 
and m E P(X) such that (2.2) holds for all bounded, ~-measurable$. 
The following proposition summarizes a few results from [4] and [5]. 
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Proposition 2.1. The following are equivalent statements about an inference q 
relative to a given model p: 
(a) q is coherent 
(b) q is the posterior of some prior n, 
(c) p and q are consistent, 
(d) For every bounded, real-valued ~-measurable function$ on 0xX, 
where $
8
(x) = $(8,x) = ~x(e). 
The results of the proposition are stated as in [4] and [5] for general p 
and q which are not necessarily measurable. Thus the inner integrals in (2.2), 
X . 
corresponding to p6($8 ) and qx(¢ ), need not be measurable functions of e and x, 
respectively. This is the reason why n and m must be defined on all subsets of 
their respective spaces 0 and X. Now if p and q are measurable, then so are the 
X functions p8(96) and qx($) and we need only specify n and m on ~(0) and ~(X), 
respectively, for (2.2) to make sense. It is also easy to see that the 
proposition remains true for measurable p and q if we consider priors and 
marginals to be defined only on the appropriate a-fields. 
Let M(0) and M(X) be the collections of countably additive measures defined 
on §(0) and ~(X), respectively. By an improper prior is meant an element» of 
M(0) such that n(0) is infinite. Suppose that, for a given statistical model p, 
there is a reference measure v ~ M(X) such that every p9 is absolutely 
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continuous with respect to v. Let f(•je) be the density for Pe· For x £ X, 
define 




whenever the denominator is finite and not zero and let q be an arbitrary fixed 
X 
element of P(0) otherwise. The inference q is called the formal posterior of 
the improper prior n. If f(•j•) is §-measurable and if the denominator above is 
v-almost everywhere finite and positive, then q is a measurable inference. Of 
course, if n is proper and countably additive on ~(0), then the q given by (2.3) 
is a genuine posterior for n and is coherent by Proposition 1. 
3. Approximation by proper priors. 
Let a and B be measures on ~(0) and define the total variation distance by 
(3. 1 ) I la-e I I 1 ,1, £ L (0) l , 'l' Q) J 
where Lm(0) is the space of bounded, real-valued, ~(0)-measurable functions on 
0. Next consider an inference q and a prior n £ P(0) which has marginal m and 
posterior q. Define 
(3.2) 
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which can be thought of as the expected distance between the inferences q and q 
when the expectation is calculated from the marginal of the prior n. 
Definition. The inference q is approximable by proper priors (a.p.p.) if 
where the infimum is over all n, q such that n E P(0) and q is the posterior of 
n. If n is an improper prior with formal posterior q, we say that n is 
approximable by proper priors (a.p.p.) if q is. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, this notion of approximation was 
inspired by Stone [8] who did not, however, consider finitely additive priors. 
Theorem 3.1. An inference q is coherent if and only if it is approximable by 
proper priors • 
.!!:2.2!= If q is coherent, then, by Proposition 1, there exists n c P(0) with 
posterior q = q and d (q,q) = o. 
n 
Suppose now that q is a.p.p •• We will use Proposition 1 (d) to show that q 
is coherent. 
Let~ E L~(0xX) and e > O. Set b = supl~I- Choose n E P(0) with posterior 




d,r(q,q) < e:/b. 
f X I - X I qx(~ )m(dx) - qx(~ )m(dx)j 
f X - X ~ IQ(¢) - q (~ )jm(dx) X X 




Because e: is arbitrary q satisfies (d) of Proposition 1. o 
Suppose now that ,r is an improper prior, p8 (dx) = f(xlo)v(dx) for every 
a e: 0, and ,r has formal posterior q as in (2.3). The natural and often used way 
to attempt an approximation of q by pr~per priors is to truncate ,r to a set of 
finite measure. To be precise, let Ke: ~(0) satisfy O < ir(K) < 00 and define the 
8 
truncation of n to K as the proper prior nK where 
(3.4) 
Let qK and mK be the posterior and marginal determined by nK, respectively. 





a J f(x!e)w(d9) 
K 
It seems likely that, for measurable models, whenever q is a.p.p., it can be 
approximated by truncations. However, we have not proved such a result. 
For a certain class of group invariant problems, M. Stone [8] showed that 
Haar measure used as an improper prior, could be approximated in a sense close 
to the present one by truncations. A similar result was obtained for amenable, 
locally compact groups in [4]. Suppose X = 0 = G is such a group and the model 
-1 pis a generalized translation family p8 (dx) = f(e x)v(dx), where vis right 
Haar measure. 
(3.6) 
If vis used as an improper prior, the corresponding inference is 
-1 q (de)~ f(e x)v(de) 
X 
and is coherent by [4, Theorem 3]. Stone [9] has also given examples which 
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illustrate that this inference need not be coherent if G is not amenable. 
In general, the criterion of approximability by proper priors seems 
difficult to apply directly. For example, it follows from the discussion above 
that, if pis a translation family on the line such as the N(e,1), then Lebesque 
measure, de, gives a coherent inference. however, it remains unclear whether 
2 -1 improper priors such as a de or jej de will do so. The next result gives a 
sufficient condition for coherence which allows us to check that the 
corresponding inferences are coherent. 
Suppose ff is an improper prior with formal posterior q. For each K £ ~(0) 
such that O < ff(K) < m, define 
(3.7) 
Herem,, is the marginal on X determined by the truncated prior•~· The number 
~ 
!(K) is the posterior probability under n that et K averaged under the 
truncation of ff to K. More crudely, S(K) is the chance that q says 0 t K given 
that 0 EK. 
Theorem 3.2. If 
(3.8) inf{B(K): 0 < ff(K) < ~} ~ O, 
then ff is approximable by proper priors. Indeed, given K £ ~(0) with 
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0 < n(K) < e, B(K) ~ d (qK,q) S 2B(K). 
,rk 
Proof: It suffices to prove the inequalities. For the first inequality, notice 
that, for all a, q~(Kc) = O and so, by (3.1), 
The first inequality now follows from (3.2) and (3.7). 
To prove the second inequality, let$ E L~(0) and supj~J ~ 1. The 
inequality will follow from (3.1), (3.2), and (3.7) once it is shown that 
(3. 9) 
To verify (3.9), first use the triangle inequality to see 
(3. 10) s I J" $dq I + I J q,dq - f ¢dqK 1. 
Kc x K x J K x 
Because supj~I ~ 1, the first term on the right side of (3.9) is obviously 
bounded by q (Kc). To obtain the same bound for the second term on the right 
X 




K I j f(xje)11(de) 
T f(xle)ir(d6) 
JKc j f(xle)11(de) D 
By Theorems 1 and 2, condition (3.8) is a sufficient condition for the 
formal posterior q to be coherent. Again we do not know whether it is 
necessary. The condition can often be checked as will be illustrated in the 
next section with two examples. 
4. Two applications to translation families. 
In this section, 0 = X = Rd, ct-dimensional Euclidean space, and de or ctx has 
its usual interpretation as Lebesgue measure. The prior ,r will be a fixed 
improper prior 
,r(d9) 0 g(e)de 
where the prior "density" g is nonnegative, and Borel measurable. The model p 
is assumed to be a measurable translation family given by a family of densities 
p8 (dx) = f(x-e)dx 
where f is Borel measurable. Assume also that the denominator on the right side 
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of (2.3) is Lebesgue almost everywhere finite and positive so that formula 
(2.3), which gives the formal posterior q of n, can be rewritten as 
(4.1) h(elx> f(x-e)g(e) 
CJ f(x-$)g($)d¢ 
where h(elx) is a density for Qx· Write lel for the Euclidean norm of e e Rd 
and let n be the truncation of n to the ball B = {8: le! ~ n}. Let qn be the 
n n 
posterior for~ and Bayes formula then gives the density below for qn 
n X 
(4.2) f(x-e)g(e) 
l f(x-$)g(~)d~ B 
n 
le I ~ n. 
So that (~.2) will be valid, assume n(B) < m for all n. For simplicity assume 
n 
n(B) > O also. However, there is no real loss in generality because we will 
n 
only need below that n(B) is positive for n large and this follows from our 
n 
assumption that n(0) = m. 
If the tails of the prior density g grow too rapidly, the inference q need 
not be coherent even for quite well-behaved translation models. 
Example 4.1. (Stone [9]) Suppose 0 = X = R1, p8 is N(e,1), and g(e) = exp(aa) 
where a> O. Use (4.1) to see that qx is N(x+a,1). In Proposition 2.1 (d), 




q (¢X) c q [-M x+a] c qQ[-oo,a]: _21• 
X X ' 
Thus q is incoherent. 
The critical feature of this example is the exponential growth of the prior 
density g. The normal model could be replaced by many translation families 
including, for example, the uniform translation model where p0 is the uniform 
distribution on the interval [8,0+1]. Thus the exponential growth of g is too 
much even when the p8 have compact support. Here is a condition which rules out 
such growth for g. 
(GC) Growth Condition: For every a> O, lim 
n~co 
= 1. 
Notice that a prior density which behaves asymptotically like a polynomial 
will satisfy (GC). 
The next lemma gives another sufficient condition for coherence when» 
satisfies (GC). In its statement m denotes the marginal determined by the 
n 
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truncated prior 1r and the model p. 
n 
Lemma 4.1. Assume 1r satisfies (GC) and let a~ o. Then the following are true. 
(a) nn(Bn-a) ~ 
(b) m (B ) ~ 
n n-a 
as n ~ 00 • 
( c) q is coherent if 
(4.3) supJ J g(e)f(x-e)dedx < ~. 
n 8 BC 
n-a n 
Proof: (a) This is obvious if a• O and immediate from (GC) if a> o. 
(b) Let£> o. choose b > o such that p0 (Bb) > 1-£. Then p8 (Bb+e) = 
p0 (Bb) > 1-£ for all e. Now calculate. 




~ f p8(Bb+e)1r (d8) ~ (1-E)n (B b). 8 n n n-a-
n-a-b 
(The next to last inequality holds because Bb + e c B for a£ B b.) Now 
- n-a n-a-
use part ( a) • 
(c) Let£> O. By (3.7) and part (b), 
B(B) • J q (Bc)m (dx) 
n x n n 
< £ + 
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q (Bc)m (dx) 
x n n 
for n sufficiently large. By Theorem 3.1 and 3.2, the coherence of q will be 
established if we show 
(4.4) lim 
n~ I q (B0 )m (dx) = o. 8 x n n 
n-a 
To see this, let f be the density form which is given by 
n n 




and use (4.1) to write 
Hence 
f f(x-e)g(e)cta BC 
q/B~) = J n 
f(x-a)g(e)da 
q (Bc)m (dx) < - 1- f f f(x-e)g(e)da. 
X n n m n(Bn) B BC 
n-a n 
Thus, (4.4) follows from (4.3) because n(B) ~ ~. o 
n 
The final condition of Lemma 4.1 can be viewed as a joint growth condition 
on the densities for the prior and the model. We will now apply it to two 
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special situations. 
Theorem 4.1. 1 Suppose 0 = X = R Assume ~(d9) = g(8)d8 is an improper prior 
with g uniformly bounded and p8 (dx) = f(x-e)dx is a translation family such that 
Jjxjf(x)dx < m Then the formal posterior q is coherent. 
Proof: Because g is bounded, it satisfies (GC) and it suffices by Lemma 4.1 (c) 
to show that 
(4.5) In J f(x-e)d9dx ~ 2EIZI 
-n BC 
n 
where Z is a random variable with density f(x). 
Us the fact that -z has density f(-x) and calculate as follows: 
J8c r f(x-e )de + r f(x-e)cte = -oof(x-e)de n 
n r f(-8)d9 + r f(8 )de = 
n-x n+x 
= P[-Z ~ n-x] + P[Z ~ n+x]. 
Hence, 
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f(x-8)d8dx = f" {P[-Z ~ n-x] + P[Z ~ n+x]}dx 
-n 
= f2"{P[-Z ~ y] + P[Z ~ y]}dy 
0 
a 2 f2nP[IZI ~ y]dy 
0 
~ 2E IZ I. o 
Theorem 4.2. Suppose 0 = X = Rd and pis a normal translation family p0 -
V 
Nd(e,r) where r is nonsingular, positive definite. If ~(de)= g(O)d8 is an 
improper prior satisfying (GC) and g{e) ~ klelr for some positive constants k 
and r, then the formal posterior q is coherent. 
Proof: Let f be the density for Po - N(O,r). It is easy to check that, for 
every s > O, there is ant> Osuch that f(x) S ilxl-s• Thus the theorem 
follows from the next lemma. 
Lemma 4.2. If~ satisfies (GC), g(G) = O(jalr) for some r > O, and f(x) = 
-s O(jxj ) for some s > r+d, then the formal posterior q is coherent. 
Proof: By Lemma 4.1 (c), it suffices to show the following expression is 
bounded inn. 
18 
( 4 .6) le ( Ix-a l-5 d9dx 
= f f l9+xlrl$l-sd$dx 
B l<i>+xl>n 
. n .. 
~£(~)I lxlr-k f l$lk-sd~dx. 
k=O Bn l$+xl>n 
Now evaluate the inside integral. 
Change to polar coordinates to see that 
f lel jde j+d r-s+d = en ~ en • Be D 
n 
Both Theorems 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 illustrate that coherence of an inference 
from an improper prior depends on the relationship between the prior and the 
model, and not on the prior alone. In fact, given any improper prior w(cta) = 
g(e)de, there is a model p for which the formal posterior q is incoherent. For 
example, if 0 R1 and g is locally integrable and everywhere positive, then the 
transformation 
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$ = $(8) = log(f
8
s(t)dt), a> o 
0 
~ -los(f0s(t)dt), a< o 
a 
gives a prior n'(d¢) = e~d~ and the normal model of example 4.1 will lead to an 
incoherent inference. 
5. A measurable model and finitely additive prior for which there is no 
coherent inference. 
Let X = 0 = E = {0,±1,±2, ••• } and let p be the translation model such that 
for all e. Take the prior n to be of the form 
n = (µ+v)/2 
whereµ is countably additive with support the set A of integers divisible by 4 
and vis purely finitely additive and supported by the set B of integers equal 
to 2 modulo 4. Thus µ(A)= 1 and µ{n} > O for n £ A; ~(B) = 1 and v{n} = O for 
all n. (This example is related to one of Dubin~ [2, p. 205]). 
Lemma 5.1. There is no posterior for the prior n. 
Proof: Assume, to get a contradiction, that n has a posterior q and let m be 
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the corresponding marginal on X. Let O be the set of odd integers. Clearly, 
p8 (o) = 1 for a£ E =AU Band, by (2.1), m(O) = 1 also. 
The key point is that q (A)= for all x £ O. To see this, suppose 
X 
x = 4n + 1, write P for the joint distribution and calculate. 
Also, 
Hence, 
P[o 4n,x = 4n+1] = n{4n}p4n{4n+1} = µ{~n}/4. 
P[8 = 4n,x = 4n+1] = m{4n+1}q {4n} = 
X 




Similarly, if x m 4n + 3, 
q (A)= q {4n+4} = 1. 
X X 
Thus 
P(AxX) = f qx(A)m(dx) = 1, 
But 
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P(AxX) = n(A) = 1/2, 
a contradiction. o 
It is not difficult to see that, given E > 0, there is an E-posterior q for 
n in the sense that the two sides of (2.2) are within E of each other for all 
~-measurable~ with values in (0,1]. (In the terminology of (1], the 
distribution of (x,e) is nearly strategic but not strategic.) It would be 
interesting to know whether there are a measurable panda finitely additive n 
for which there is no £-posterior. This can happen for finitely additive pas 
is shown in [3] and (7]. 
References 
1. Armstrong, T.E. and Sudderth, W.D. (1981). Nearly strategic measures. 
Pacific J. Math. 94 251-257. 
2. de Finetti, B. (1972). Probability. Induction, and Statistics. Wiley, New 
York. 
3. Dubins, L. (1975). Finitely additive conditional probabilities, 
conglomerability, and disintegrations. Ann. Probability 3 89-99. 
~- Heath, D. and Sudderth, W. (1978). On finitely additive priors, coherence, 
and extended admissibility. Ann. siatist. 6 333-345. 
5. Lane, D. and Sudderth, w. (1983). Coherent and continuous inference. Ann. 
Statist. 11 114-120. 
6. Lane, D. and Sudderth, W. (1984). Coherent predictive inference. Sankhya, 
Series A 46 166-185. 
22 
7. Prikry, K. and Sudderth, W. (1982). Singularity with respect to strategic 
measures. Illinois J. Math. 26 460-465. 
8. Stone, M. (1965). Right Haar measure for convergence in probability to 
quasi posterior distributions. Ann. Math. Statist. 36 440-453. 
9. Stone, M. (1976). Strong inconsistency from uniform priors. Jour. Amer. 
Statist. Assoc. 71 114-116. 
23 
